## CS345 Data Mining

Link Analysis 3: Hubs and Authorities Spam Detection

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
### Problem formulation (1998)

- ☐ Suppose we are given a collection of documents on some broad topic
  - e.g., stanford, evolution, iraq
  - perhaps obtained through a text search
- ☐ Can we organize these documents in some manner?
  - Page rank offers one solution
  - HITS (Hypertext-Induced Topic Selection) is another
    - □ proposed at approx the same time

#### HITS Model

- ☐ Interesting documents fall into two classes
- Authorities are pages containing useful information
  - course home pages
  - home pages of auto manufacturers
- 2. Hubs are pages that link to authorities
  - course bulletin
  - list of US auto manufacturers

# Idealized view




### Mutually recursive definition

- ☐ A good hub links to many good authorities
- □ A good authority is linked from many good hubs
- ☐ Model using two scores for each node
  - Hub score and Authority score
  - Represented as vectors h and a

#### Transition Matrix A

- □ HITS uses a matrix A[i, j] = 1 if page i links to page j, 0 if not
- $\square$   $A^T$ , the transpose of A, is similar to the PageRank matrix M, but  $A^T$  has 1's where M has fractions

## Example



### **Hub and Authority Equations**

- ☐ The hub score of page P is proportional to the sum of the authority scores of the pages it links to
  - $\blacksquare$  **h** =  $\lambda Aa$
  - Constant λ is a scale factor
- ☐ The authority score of page P is proportional to the sum of the hub scores of the pages it is linked from
  - $\mathbf{a} = \mu A^T \mathbf{h}$
  - Constant µ is scale factor

## Iterative algorithm

- ☐ Initialize **h**, **a** to all 1's
- □ h = Aa
- ☐ Scale **h** so that its max entry is 1.0
- $\Box$  a = A<sup>T</sup>h
- ☐ Scale **a** so that its max entry is 1.0
- □ Continue until **h**, **a** converge

### Example

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \qquad A^{T} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$


#### **Existence and Uniqueness**

- $\boldsymbol{h}\,=\,\lambda\mathcal{A}\boldsymbol{a}$
- $\mathbf{a} = \mu A^T \mathbf{h}$
- $\boldsymbol{h} \,=\, \lambda \boldsymbol{\mu} \boldsymbol{\mathcal{A}} \boldsymbol{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathcal{T}} \boldsymbol{h}$
- $\mathbf{a} = \lambda \mu A^T A \mathbf{a}$

Under reasonable assumptions about **A**, the dual iterative algorithm converges to vectors **h\*** and **a\*** such that:

- h\* is the principal eigenvector of the matrix AA<sup>T</sup>
- $\mathbf{a}^*$  is the principal eigenvector of the matrix  $A^TA$

## Bipartite cores



#### Secondary cores

- ☐ A single topic can have many bipartite cores
  - corresponding to different meanings, or points of view
  - abortion: pro-choice, pro-life
  - evolution: darwinian, intelligent design
  - jaguar: auto, Mac, NFL team, panthera onca
- ☐ How to find such secondary cores?

#### Non-primary eigenvectors

- ☐ AA<sup>T</sup> and A<sup>T</sup>A have the same set of eigenvalues
  - An eigenpair is the pair of eigenvectors with the same eigenvalue
  - The primary eigenpair (largest eigenvalue) is what we get from the iterative algorithm
- □ Non-primary eigenpairs correspond to other bipartite cores
  - The eigenvalue is a measure of the density of links in the core

#### Finding secondary cores

- ☐ Once we find the primary core, we can remove its links from the graph
- □ Repeat HITS algorithm on residual graph to find the next bipartite core
- ☐ Technically, not exactly equivalent to non-primary eigenpair model

### Creating the graph for HITS

■ We need a well-connected graph of pages for HITS to work well



### Page Rank and HITS

- ☐ Page Rank and HITS are two solutions to the same problem
  - What is the value of an inlink from S to D?
  - In the page rank model, the value of the link depends on the links **into** S
  - In the HITS model, it depends on the value of the other links out of S
- □ The destinies of Page Rank and HITS post-1998 were very different
  - Why?

#### Web Spam

- ☐ Search has become the default gateway to the web
- □ Very high premium to appear on the first page of search results
  - e.g., e-commerce sites
  - advertising-driven sites

#### What is web spam?

- ☐ Spamming = any deliberate action solely in order to boost a web page's position in search engine results, incommensurate with page's real value
- □ Spam = web pages that are the result of spamming
- ☐ This is a very broad defintion
  - SEO industry might disagree!
  - SEO = search engine optimization
- □ Approximately 10-15% of web pages are spam

#### Web Spam Taxonomy

- □ We follow the treatment by Gyongyi and Garcia-Molina [2004]
- Boosting techniques
  - Techniques for achieving high relevance/importance for a web page
- □ Hiding techniques
  - Techniques to hide the use of boosting
    - □ From humans and web crawlers

#### Boosting techniques

- □ Term spamming
  - Manipulating the text of web pages in order to appear relevant to queries
- Link spamming
  - Creating link structures that boost page rank or hubs and authorities scores

### **Term Spamming**

#### □ Repetition

- of one or a few specific terms e.g., free, cheap, viagra
- Goal is to subvert TF.IDF ranking schemes

#### Dumping

- of a large number of unrelated terms
- e.g., copy entire dictionaries

### □ Weaving

- Copy legitimate pages and insert spam terms at random positions
- □ Phrase Stitching
  - Glue together sentences and phrases from different sources

#### Term spam targets


- Body of web page
- □ Title
- □ URL
- ☐ HTML meta tags
- □ Anchor text

### Link spam


- ☐ Three kinds of web pages from a spammer's point of view
  - Inaccessible pages
  - Accessible pages
    - □ e.g., web log comments pages
    - □ spammer can post links to his pages
  - Own pages
    - □ Completely controlled by spammer
    - ☐ May span multiple domain names

#### Link Farms

- Spammer's goal
  - Maximize the page rank of target page t
- □ Technique
  - Get as many links from accessible pages as possible to target page t
  - Construct "link farm" to get page rank multiplier effect



#### **Analysis**



Suppose rank contributed by accessible pages = xLet page rank of target page = y


Rank of each "farm" page =  $\beta y/M + (1-\beta)/N$ 

 $y = x + \beta M[\beta y/M + (1-\beta)/N] + (1-\beta)/N$ 

=  $x + \beta^2 y + \beta(1-\beta)M/N + (1-\beta)/N$  Very small; ignore

 $y = x/(1-\beta^2) + cM/N \text{ where } c = \beta/(1+\beta)$ 

### **Analysis**



- $\square$  y = x/(1- $\beta$ <sup>2</sup>) + cM/N where c =  $\beta$ /(1+ $\beta$ )
- $\square$  For  $\beta = 0.85$ ,  $1/(1-\beta^2) = 3.6$ 
  - Multiplier effect for "acquired" page rank
  - By making M large, we can make y as large as we want

#### Hiding techniques

- Content hiding
  - Use same color for text and page background
- Cloaking
  - Return different page to crawlers and browsers
- □ Redirection
  - Alternative to cloaking
  - Redirects are followed by browsers but not crawlers

#### **Detecting Spam**

- □ Term spamming
  - Analyze text using statistical methods e.g., Naïve Bayes classifiers
  - Similar to email spam filtering
  - Also useful: detecting approximate duplicate pages
- □ Link spamming
  - Open research area
  - One approach: TrustRank


#### TrustRank idea

- ☐ Basic principle: approximate isolation
  - It is rare for a "good" page to point to a "bad" (spam) page
- ☐ Sample a set of "seed pages" from the web
- ☐ Have an oracle (human) identify the good pages and the spam pages in the seed set
  - Expensive task, so must make seed set as small as possible

#### **Trust Propagation**

- ☐ Call the subset of seed pages that are identified as "good" the "trusted pages"
- Set trust of each trusted page to 1
- □ Propagate trust through links
  - Each page gets a trust value between 0 and
  - Use a threshold value and mark all pages below the trust threshold as spam

#### Example



### Rules for trust propagation

#### □ Trust attenuation

- The degree of trust conferred by a trusted page decreases with distance
- □ Trust splitting
  - The larger the number of outlinks from a page, the less scrutiny the page author gives each outlink
  - Trust is "split" across outlinks

#### Simple model

- ☐ Suppose trust of page p is t(p)
- Set of outlinks O(p)For each  $q \in O(p)$ , p confers the trust
- □ Trust is additive
  - Trust of p is the sum of the trust conferred on p by all its inlinked pages
- Note similarity to Topic-Specific Page
  - Within a scaling factor, trust rank = biased page rank with trusted pages as teleport set

#### Picking the seed set

- Two conflicting considerations
  - Human has to inspect each seed page, so seed set must be as small as possible
  - Must ensure every "good page" gets adequate trust rank, so need make all good pages reachable from seed set by short paths

### Approaches to picking seed set

- ☐ Suppose we want to pick a seed set of k pages
- □ PageRank
  - Pick the top k pages by page rank
  - Assume high page rank pages are close to other highly ranked pages
  - We care more about high page rank "good" pages

#### Inverse page rank

- ☐ Pick the pages with the maximum number of outlinks
- □ Can make it recursive
  - Pick pages that link to pages with many outlinks
- ☐ Formalize as "inverse page rank"
  - Construct graph G' by reversing each edge in web graph G
  - Page Rank in G' is inverse page rank in G
- ☐ Pick top k pages by inverse page rank

### Spam Mass

- ☐ In the TrustRank model, we start with good pages and propagate trust
- □ Complementary view: what fraction of a page's page rank comes from "spam" pages?
- ☐ In practice, we don't know all the spam pages, so we need to estimate

### Spam mass estimation

r(p) = page rank of page p
r+(p) = page rank of p with teleport into
"good" pages only

 $r^{-}(p) = r(p) - r^{+}(p)$ 

Spam mass of  $p = r^{-}(p)/r(p)$ 

#### Good pages

- □ For spam mass, we need a large set of "good" pages
  - Need not be as careful about quality of individual pages as with TrustRank
- □ One reasonable approach
  - .edu sites
  - gov sites
  - .mil sites

#### Experimental results

From Gyongyi et al, 2006

## Another approach

- ☐ Backflow from known spam pages
  - Course project from last year's edition of this course
- ☐ Still an open area of research...